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The Database of Demining Accidents: - a driving force in
HMA

by Andy Smith
[A strangely edited version of this paper was published in the JMU
Journal of Mine Action, Summer 2011.
This is something closer to the original.]
I started the Database of Demining Accidents (DDAS) in
1998 using public data gathered for the United States Army
Communications-Electronics Command, Night Vision &
Electronic Sensors Directorate. When they declined to
publish and update the database, I did so with their tacit
approval but no funding support. I did this in the hope of
improving safety for deminers. The database is an easy-touse system containing the original demining accident
reports overlaid with easy-search summaries.

DDAS Influence on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)
Having a collection of field reports about demining
accidents and the context surrounding them has influenced
the evolution of the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS). Basing IMAS content on empirical evidence rather
than received wisdom enhanced and contributed to the
general acceptance of the IMAS. But when the IMAS were
taken over by UNMAS in 2011, they became compromised.
No longer independent, the IMAS are led by an
organisation with one of the worst records for recording and
sharing lessons learned from accidents.
During the drafting of IMAS 2001, the DDAS proved
invaluable in settling disputes about basic demining safety
considerations. At that time, the received wisdom was that
deminers lay down to excavate, should wear personal
protective equipment with ballistic helmets and back-panels,
and that the most common demining accident involved
stepping on a mine. Deminers’ protective visors had to be
13-millimetres thick, and casualty evacuation by helicopter
was required at all sites. Not surprisingly, these “idealised”
U.N. standards were not being applied by any U.N.
programme.

In the absence of other data, the U.N. standards (1997)
were crippled by excessive caution that made them entirely
impractical and of no value to field operatives. When the
U.N. standards were abandoned in favour of "International
Standards", the evidence in the database of demining
accidents was used to establish the following:
The activities conducted when accidents occur;
The mines/devices involved in accidents;
The areas of the body most in need of protection;
The effectiveness of protection used;
The working methods most common around the world;
The limitations of commonly used metal-detectors;
The shortcomings of some mine-detection dog procedures
and processes;
The minimum level of medical provision needed; and
That mechanical demining was not the panacea it was
claimed to be.
With the database as evidence, it was possible to show the
following:
In almost all cases, deminers did not lie down to excavate:
they knelt or squatted;
Anti-Personnel blast mines were the most common device
involved in accidents;
Severe eye and hand/arm injuries were more common than
severe leg injuries;
Heavy PPE was rarely worn correctly;
No commonly used PPE could provide appropriate
protection against the close-quarter detonation of a
fragmentation device;
There was no reason to believe that a ballistic helmet or
armour back-panel were necessary during demining tasks;
High-tech blast boots were of no proven advantage and
could give false confidence, while common footwear (not
designed to prevent blast injury) was equally
effective/ineffective when stepping on the smallest mines;
Safer working procedures were more likely to prevent
severe injury than the use of more PPE;
Traumatic injury was increasingly rare and could usually be
stabilized in the field by appropriately trained and equipped
paramedics; and
Shortcomings in management, leadership and training
could be identified as a primary or contributory cause in the
majority of accidents.
Not all of these findings were universally accepted, but the
evidence meant that they could not be ignored and a
process of compromise within the IMAS Board membership
could begin with the aim of achieving a pragmatic and

practical consensus.

The Database of Demining Accidents contains the original
demining accident reports overlaid with a summary and
easy-search facility. Always available on request, the
database records were put online at
http://www.ddasonline.com in 2006. This site receives an
average of 500+ discrete visits a day, with the most popular
topic being “Deminer training”
(http://ddasonline.com/suggested_training_usesDDAS.htm).

Post-2001 IMAS Updates
The Database has provided evidence in support of several
updates to the 2001 IMAS. Unsurprisingly, the relevant
updates were all related to field safety in one way or
another.
1) The distinction between “working-distances”
and “safety-distances” in IMAS 10.20 was
supported by accident data analysis that showed
that the minimum safety-distances imposed for
an anti-personnel blast-mine risk were frequently
ignored and that secondary injuries only
occurred when a second person was very close
to the detonation. The required IMAS distance
was actually a “safe distance” for a deliberate
detonation (with a large safety margin) but was
often impractical and unnecessary during field
operations. A distinction between workingdistances (when no deliberate detonations will
occur) and safety-distances (when deliberate
detonations will be made) was introduced. This
allowed more people to work simultaneously in

many areas, thereby increasing efficiency.
Incidentally, this may also have increased field
safety by making supervision easier.
2) Evidence from the database was used to
support the contention that the largest ERW in a
minefield should not be presumed to be the
greatest threat when determining working
distances. It was decided that the greatest threat
should be the largest device that could be
detonated when using the selected procedures
and tools. This meant that in mixed antipersonnel and anti-tank minefields, manual
working distances could often be based on the
anti-personnel mine threat.
3) As a result of evidence that visors were
habitually not worn, or worn incorrectly, IMAS
10.30 was redrafted to allow other eye
protection as a minimum. 5mm polycarbonate
goggles became the minimum requirement
(subject to a risk assessment), although full-face
visors remained the preferred option.
4) The final wording of the first Land Release
IMAS 08.20, 08.21 and 08.22 was also informed
by a close knowledge of the accident record.
5) Changes to IMAS 09.30 Explosive Ordnance
Disposal were informed by the EOD accident
record.
6) The IMAS Technical Notes 10.20-02/09 for
Mine Action on Field Risk Assessment depends
heavily on an intimate knowledge of the accident
record and the factors that commonly contribute
to accidents.
7) A significant number of accident reports
include elements that show the investigators did
not know (or had misunderstood) the IMAS
requirements. This has supported arguments for
simplifying the language and presentation of
IMAS documents - without much obvious
success. The quality and consistency of IMAS
documentation has fallen since the UNMAS
takeover.

Research
The authority of the database as an objective record has

been widely accepted. Evidence from the database is
frequently cited in academic papers (Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Master of Arts at York, U.K., and doctorate
research at University of Genova, Italy, for example). In the
U.S.A, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology runs
doctorate research requiring students to study accidents
from the database, and other universities have asked for
permission to link to the DDAS site. The Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research, a government research
institute in South Africa, has based several projects on the
results of studying the DDAS. Between 2001 and 2010,
technical inquiries to UNMAS were frequently answered
with reference to DDAS accident records.
The database cannot be used to prove much statistically
because it does not include all accident records and relies
on the honesty and sometimes questionable objectivity of
the original accident investigators. However, the database
allows qualitative assessments backed by quantitative
analysis, together providing compelling semi-quantitative
evidence of general conclusions that are far more
compelling than any individual’s personal opinion. For an
explanation of the quantitative and qualitative data analysis,
see http://ddasonline.com/observeinferDDAS.htm.

Lessons Learned
In 2008, the author’s DDAS analysis showed the following:
> Failings in management and supervision have
increased over time.
> An increase of expatriate field supervisors who
had limited knowledge or appropriate experience
regarding humanitarian demining. Some
suffered accidents; others were a direct cause of
them.
> Many expatriates routinely applied doublestandards and did not comply with their own
rules: Their leadership abilities were
questionable. Evidence of this recurs within the
database records when basic rules of minefield
safety are not applied despite the presence of
an expatriate on site. For example, in accident
DDAS468 no interior mined-area marking was
used to delineate the division between cleared
and uncleared areas in a dense minefield. This
was not an error but an expatriate decision. A
deminer was killed when inadvertently entering
the uncleared area, stepping on one mine and

falling onto another. An alternative and frequent
example is the inclusion in accident reports of
photographs showing expatriate supervisors
inside the mined area while work is being
conducted who are not wearing the required
PPE. There are also several examples of recent
expatriate fatalities in which PPE was not used
and the demining organisation's SOPs were
being broken.
> Severe hand/arm injuries became more
common than severe eye injuries, albeit by a
very small margin.
> Cheap (sub $500) PPE was as effective as
expensive PPE and often easier to use. Body
protection aprons with a NATO STANAG V50 of
380 m/s were involved in more than 30
accidents and always provided effective
protection, even when faced with boosted AP
blast mines.
> Visors used in the field more than five years
shattered in several accidents, confirming that
sun-hardening could be a problem (this led to
UNMAS Technical Note 10.10 / 02 for Mine
Action addressing the subject).
> Wearing a full-face visor did not reduce the
incidence of severe eye injury because it was so
often raised.
> The need for dedicated on-site ambulance
vehicles was reinforced when an accident
occurred in which the only vehicle, plus the only
radio, were destroyed in an anti-tank mine
accident at a remote minefield and several
fatalities resulted.
> Common training needs of deminers and
medical staff were identified.
Some of these conclusions were difficult for IMAS Board
Members or field practitioners to accept, but the evidence
made them hard to reject.

Data Gathering and Security
Responsible field staff provide accident records because
they understand that sharing this information might prevent
the unnecessary repetition of avoidable accidents. UNMAS

has supplied a few accident records, but no one has
conducted a comprehensive data-gathering exercise so the
incomplete DDAS is the only useful record of accidents in
the industry. The value of a good accident archive is
recognised in all hazardous professions except, it seems,
mine action.
The current number of recorded victims in the DDAS is
close to 1,000. This includes all the records for some
countries in some periods, which has allowed an
assessment of the data-spread to conclude that the records
are broadly representative of all injurious humanitariandemining accidents.
Despite the current IMAS requirement for demining groups
to share accident data, many do not. Accident secrecy has
been a constant problem, arising sometimes out of loyalty
to colleagues and sometimes because the investigators
want to protect the victim’s insurance payout. It is hard to
criticize demining groups when UNDP, UNOPS and
UNMAS are also reluctant to share any possibly
embarrassing data. This makes no sense because the
names of the victims, investigators or demining groups are
not published so there is no real reason to avoid sharing
accident details and the lessons that can be learned from
them.
The database has been in the public domain for 15 years
and the media or competing demining organizations have
not abused it, implying that the removal of names and
identifiers before publication has been successful in
preventing abuse.

Future Uses
The weight of evidence within the database changes as
new records are added. Currently, database evidence could
be used to improve the safety of deminers in several ways,
such as:
1) The use of purpose-designed blast-resistant
hand tools can save fingers and hands. This has
been known for more than a decade but
overlooked by managers, conscious of
insufficient resources, who instead provide
cheaper alternatives such as gardening tools
that put the user’s hand on top of the blast, then
shower the deminer with fragments as the tool
breaks up. Compelling evidence exists for the
use of purpose-designed, blast-resistant hand
tools to be made a requirement (instead of a

recommendation) in IMAS 10.30.

Accidents while excavating are now far more common than during any
other activity.
2) Using a pickaxe has been common in some
countries for at least 15 years. Clearing mines
with a pickaxe sounds bizarre, but when starting
an excavation in compacted or rocky ground,
other tools can be ineffective and frustratingly
slow. Banning the use of the pickaxe has been
tried—and widely ignored. Engineers at MIT
have designed an alternative tool that can do
the same job as a pickaxe with reduced risk.
The tool is far easier to guide the tip to the
intended spot, requires less energy to use and
reduces risk of severe injury if a detonation
occurs.

A field trial of this MIT device in Sri Lanka during

2006 was a success but most people have
never heard of the tool and it has not been
widely used. The existence of a pickaxe
alternative, designed to stay intact and protect
the user’s hands, should be publicized along
with examples of accidents in which pickaxes
were used.

A two-handled excavator designed at MIT to replace the pick-axe.
I believe that if the Afghans were to adopt this tool, it would prevent
at least a dozen severe hand injuries each year.
3) Manual deminers using metal detectors
provide an archetypal image of the working
deminer. While some deminers are skilled with
metal detectors, evidence indicates that many
deminers and their trainers do not understand
the limitations of these tools, and they do not
know how to use metal detectors with
confidence and competence. For example,
accidents have occurred when a detector is
wrongly adjusted and is unable to detect the
targets. Frequently, inadequate detector training
has led to inaccurate pinpointing so that the
excavation is started on top of the mine. The
accident record contains abundant evidence
supporting the need to improve metal-detector
training at all levels (managers also need to
know what will detect what) in mine-action.
4) The records contain frequent evidence that
the appointment of international staff with
inadequate knowledge of the IMAS or demining
(despite high-level academic or military
qualifications) can lead to increased risk for
working deminers. In the field, experience and a

commitment to learning from others are more
valuable qualifications than academic or military
achievement. This could be stressed in the
IMAS and put into practice by the U.N. agencies
and various demining organizations.
5) From the earliest records to the present day,
there are examples of new commercial
organizations having accidents that repeat the
obvious errors of previous accidents (recently,
this has been especially obvious in Afghanistan).
This implies that contract conditions need
revising so that the deminer’s safety shares the
same priority as cost, and which require a
knowledge of the history of demining (including
accidents) where the contract is to be
conducted.
6) The insurance provision for local deminers
injured at work throughout humanitarian mine
action is varied but always far less than an
expatriate would expect. Generally, national
deminers receive medical care and a single
payment so low that it would be considered
derisory in a Western environment. Despite
some informal attempts to provide long-term
support, there are no formal provisions for
severely disabled deminers to receive a
disability allowance or even long-term
prosthetics and therapy assistance. Among the
records, there is evidence of accident victims
who have been abandoned and have died in
extreme poverty or committed suicide. The
number in dire circumstances can only be
inferred because no comprehensive follow-up
has been conducted. Improved provision for
demining accident victims should be addressed.

Summary and Recommendations
The DDAS has been of proven value to the humanitarian
mine-action industry. It has been “a driving force” in
promoting practical change and the sharing of experience,
in creating and updating the IMAS and in the field. An
anonymous database, it protects the privacy of those
involved in accidents while allowing others to learn from
their experience.
As an industry, international mine action has not matured to
the point where it is open and transparent about its
accidents. Some individuals and groups at all levels

withhold or conceal information that could prevent future
accidents. When organizations do not disclose accident
data, the managers run the risk of appearing criminally
negligent by ignoring their responsibility for the safety and
occupational health of their staff. When U.N. agencies also
conceal accidents and so not share lessons learned, they
show that they are not responsible operators and so not
derserve respoect from professionals..
Deminers are the agents of those who fund Humanitarian
Mine Action. They work to priorities that the donors have
imposed, yet their treatment after an accident usually lacks
any sign of the humanitarian concern that lay behind their
employment. It is remarkable that a “humanitarian” industry
has made no real effort to make long-term provision for
them – despite interest shown in international forums by
expatriate field practitioners who are concerned for their
colleagues regardless of their nationality.
It is time for an agency to take the DDAS under its
management, enforce the IMAS requirement for the sharing
of accident records, and maintain the principles of
anonymity and of keeping original accident reports on which
the DDAS was founded. This would be a requirement in any
responsibly controlled industry and is a glaring omission in
humanitarian mine action. An agency should accept
responsibility for gathering accident records, creating an
archive and conducting informed analysis of that archive. I
will make the extensive DDAS records that I have
accumulated available when any credible initiative is
proposed.
In response to my prompting for action, UNMAS asked
(early 2011) the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to gather accident data in
a new system extending the “tick-box” accident records
recorded in the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA). They are to create a new database instead
of updating the existing DDAS, so losing all records kept to
date. The new version will ignore the detailed reports that
provide the core of the DDAS and make it genuinely useful.
Without the original accident report to refer to, analysis will
rely on a brief summary made by an office-based staff
member. The new UNMAS/GICHD initiative may succeed,
but the result will be “shallow” because it will depend
entirely on the many levels of interpretation between the
accident event and the “tick” placed in an available box on a
form. Such a database will not be professional, and will do
little or nothing to prevent repeated accidents.
So while I wait for a credible alternative, the database is

being updated again. Demining accident records, questions
and comments should be sent to me at
avs(at)nolandmines.com.
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